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Realistic Caution and Ambivalent Optimism: US Intelligence 
Assessments and War Preparations against Japan, 1918-1941 
 
In December 1940, less than one year before the Pacific War broke out, the Secretaries of 
State, War and Navy assessed the likelihood of Japan initiating hostilities with the US 
and its allies. Their memorandum stated that the military and political elite in Tokyo was 
contemplating a conquest of Southeast Asia in an effort to secure the oil and natural 
resources of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. 1
 
The possibility was also 
acknowledged that the Japanese might launch an expedition against the Philippines in 
order to neutralize the US Navy’s capacity to interfere. Yet, ‘it seemed more probable’ 
that Japan preferred to achieve its objectives without resorting to war. The main reason 
cited was that the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) were 
hard pressed to provide sufficient strengths for large scale operations. As long as the 
Associated Powers, including the US, British Empire, and Holland, put up a ‘vigorous 
and efficient defense’, Japanese forces had to undertake a ‘major effort’, probably lasting 
several months. Under the circumstances, the prospects of a southward expedition 
seemed open to doubt. 
The conclusion was noteworthy because it reflected the ambiguous views which the 
American defense establishment held on Japanese policy for a large part of the interwar 
years. On one hand, the leadership in Tokyo showed clear indications that it aspired to 
achieve a hegemonic position in the Far East. US intelligence staffs, along with defense 
officials, were able to identify the potential dangers which Japan’s expansionist ambitions 
were posing for western interests in Asia. At the same time, a number of factors 
precluded a clear-cut forecast. Among the most important was the opportunistic and 
secretive manner in which Japanese leaders formulated their plans. Under the 
circumstances, the available intelligence could not provide a definite indication of the 
moves which the Imperial navy and army would undertake. The situation was further 
                                                 
1 United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA 2), RG 
225, JB 325, Joint Board, War Plans Division, Roll 11, JB 325, Serial No.670, Enclosure: Study of 
Immediate Problems concerning Involvement in War, by Secretaries of State, War and Navy, 21 
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complicated because reliable pieces of evidence revealed how Japan did not possess the 
military and economic resources to defeat a coalition consisting of several great powers. 
The shortcomings also appeared to be making the Japanese government reluctant to 
commit the Imperial armed forces to a costly and extensive conflict. Therefore, the 
Americans were not inclined to anticipate a situation whereby the IJN and IJA undertook 
a full-scale conquest of the Asia-Pacific region. On the contrary, assessments on Japan’s 
strategy were more likely to raise questions whether its leaders were willing and able to 
pursue any ambitious ventures. 
 
The uncertainties surrounding Japan’s strategy gave rise to a muddled set of war plans. 
On one hand, US strategists understood that in order to win any conflict against Japan, 
their forces needed to undertake a substantial effort to achieve naval supremacy in the 
Pacific. However, the indications pointing to the problems facing the IJN and IJA, 
coupled with evidence of hesitancy on Japan’s part, led to the adoption of a policy that 
was based on the assumption that the mere presence of US forces in the Far East would 
deter aggressive moves. Again, the development was natural, given the absence of any 
firm evidence to suggest that the Japanese were planning to provoke a war against the 
western powers.  
 
Historiography 
The subject of American perceptions concerning Japanese strategy and the situation in 
the Pacific regions during the interwar period has been explored by a number of 
historians. The main works on the Washington naval treaty of 1921-22 have addressed 
the problems which the western powers faced in verifying Japan’s adherence to the 
agreements. 2 Edward Miller provided a comprehensive analysis of the strategic and 
logistical challenges which defense officials faced in preparing for a campaign aimed at 
projecting American maritime power to the far reaches of the western Pacific. 3
                                                 
2 C.L. Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921-37 (??? 1987); E. Goldstein and J.H. 
Maurer (eds), The Washington Conference, 1921-1922: naval rivalry, East Asian stability and the 
road to Pearl Harbor (??? 1994) 
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3 E. Miller, War Plan ORANGE: the US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1991) 
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official histories described how defense planners held doubts whether US forces were 
adequate to fight a global conflict.4 A number of scholars have explained the political and 
economic difficulties which the service departments faced in devising a coherent 
strategy. 5  Among the greatest hindrances was the way in which successive US 
presidential administrations maintained an isolationist policy of avoiding entanglements 
in areas beyond the western hemisphere. An equally formidable obstacle was Congress’s 
continuous effort to limit defense expenditure. However, few works have explored the 
aspect of intelligence and its influence on the policies devised by the Navy and War 
departments. The works on US intelligence prior to the Pacific War have focused on the 
efforts undertaken to decode Japan’s secret communications, and the mixed results that 
were achieved. 6 The information received from other sources, including the military 
attachés in the Far East, has not been scrutinized.7
                                                 
4 L. Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, and Strategy and Command: the first two years, in series 
United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief 
of Military History, 1962-1989); M. Matloff and E.M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition 
Warfare, M.S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, R.S. Cline, Washington 
Command Post: the Operations Division, R.M. Leighton and R.W. Coakley, Global Logistics and 
Strategy, 1940-1943, in series United States Army in World War II: The War Department 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1950-1955) 
 A number of essays have covered US 
5 G.W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: the US Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
UP, 1994), Chapter 8; E. Cohen, ‘The Strategy of Innocence? The United States, 1920-1945’, in 
W. Murray, M. Knox, and A.H. Bernstein (eds), The Making of Strategy: rulers, states and war 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1994), pp.428-65; L. Morton, ‘War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy’, in 
World Politics, Volume 11, No.2 (January 1959), pp.221-250; T. Tuleja, Statesmen and Admirals: 
quest for a Far Eastern naval policy (NY: W.W. Norton, 1963) 
6 The most significant works on US signals intelligence during the run-up to the Pearl Harbor 
attack include: L. Farago, The Broken Seal: the story of ‘Operation Magic’ and the Pearl Harbor 
disaster (NY: Random House, 1967); W. Honan, Visions of Infamy (NY: St. Martin’s, 1991); R. 
Lewin, The Other ULTRA: codes, cyphers and the defeat of Japan (London: Hutchinson, 1982); J. 
Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: the secret history of American intelligence and the Japanese 
Navy in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995); G.W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: 
the untold story of Pearl Harbor (London: Michael Joseph, 1981); R. Stinnett, Day of Deceit: the 
truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor (NY: Free Press, 1999); T. Wilford, Pearl Harbor Redefined: 
US Navy Radio Intelligence in 1941 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001); R. 
Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1962)  
7  An important exception is B. Bidwell, The History of the Military Intelligence Division, 
Department of the Army General Staff, 1775-1941 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of 
America, 1986). 
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assessments of its potential rivals.8
 
 However, they have concentrated largely on military 
aspects, such as the quality and performance of the German and Japanese armed forces, 
and tended to focus less on intelligence related to war plans. The following analysis will 
attempt to fill the gap by drawing a connection between intelligence and net assessment, 
and thereafter explain the effect on US war planning. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of US intelligence during the interwar period, it is 
important to establish a viable assessment criterion. Theorists have explained how one of 
the key hindrances to an accurate analysis is that the evaluators of intelligence, along 
with those involved in the policymaking process, tend to misinterpret the data. Richard 
Betts, for example, has argued, ‘in the best known intelligence failure, the most crucial 
mistakes have seldom been made by the collectors of raw information, occasionally by 
professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who 
consume the products of the intelligence services’. 9  Officials in a position of 
responsibility often fail to act upon the information, because they hold a number of fixed 
perceptions. The failure to properly gauge the situation can stem from several factors, 
including the ambiguous nature of the available information, the use of a flawed method 
of analysis, and last but not least, the preconceived biases which leaders hold. Michael 
Handel has also argued that the success of any intelligence activity depends upon whether 
‘leaders are open-minded and encourage criticism’, and are willing to accept ‘accurate, 
though unpleasant information’.10
 
 Military and political authorities frequently refuse to 
acknowledge the intelligence they receive, because they believe that making a decision 
based on the material entails the possibility of contradicting a pre-set policy agenda.  
                                                 
8 C.L. Christman, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment’, W. Murray and 
A.R. Millett (eds), Calculations, Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II (NY: Free Press, 
1992), pp.216-57; D. Kahn, ‘US Views of Germany and Japan in 1941’, E. May (ed.), Knowing 
One’s Enemies: intelligence assessment before the two world wars (Princeton, NJ, 1984), pp.476-
501; T.G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: US intelligence and foreign military innovation, 
1918-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002), Chapters 3-4 
9 R. Betts, ‘Analysis, War and Decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable’, in World Politics, 
Vol.31, No.1 (October 1978), p.61 
10 M. Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p.253 
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Indeed, US intelligence activities prior to the Pacific War were influenced by a number of 
misperceptions. One of the tendencies was to conclude that, because the losses which 
Japan was likely to incur in a war against the US outweighed the costs, the leadership in 
Tokyo thought likewise. By doing so, the Americans relied on a method of analysis 
which intelligence theorists and practitioners have defined as ‘projection’,11 a practice of 
projecting one’s values onto the adversary, or ‘mirror imaging’,12 that is assuming that 
the other side would follow the same principles as oneself when facing a similar situation. 
Intelligence staffs and defense officials also doubted whether the Japanese were able to 
construct a military machine that was capable of challenging the western powers, on the 
grounds that their technological advancement was not up to date. 13 Nevertheless, the key 
factor which hindered an accurate assessment was the fact that, in spite of numerous 
proclamations of a desire to undermine western influence in the Far East, the Japanese 
did not develop a firm plan for initiating hostilities against the US and its allies until the 
autumn of 1941. Even then, the government and military shrouded their strategy under a 
tight veil of secrecy. Under the circumstances, the bulk of the intelligence appeared in the 
form of ‘noise’, or data which created a confused picture, rather than ‘signals’ which 
provided firm indications of an impending attack.14
 
 For this reason, any judgment needs 
properly examine the results achieved with the limited data that US intelligence managed 
to obtain. 
                                                 
11 R. Betts, Surprise Attack: lessons for defense planning (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
1982), p.120-2; Handel, War, Strategy, p.242 
12 M. Lowenthal, ‘The Burdensome Concept of Failure’, in A.C. Maurer et al (eds), Intelligence: 
policy and process (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), pp.44, 49; M. Herman, Intelligence Power in 
Peace and War (Cambridge: CUP / London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996) p.228; 
Handel, War, Strategy, p.250 
13 See Mahnken, Ways of War, Chapter 3; D. Ford, ‘US Naval Intelligence and the Imperial 
Japanese Fleet during the Washington Treaty Era, c.1922-1936’, in Mariner’s Mirror, Volume 93, 
No.3 (2007), pp.281-306; and ‘The Best Equipped Army in Asia?: US Military Intelligence and 
the Imperial Japanese Army before the Pacific War, 1919-1941, in International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Volume 21, No.1 (2008), pp.86-121. 
14 For an explanation of the problems of ‘signals’ vs. ‘noise’, see Handel, War, Strategy, pp.236-7. 
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US strategic priorities, and subsequent functions and organization of the 
intelligence establishment  
Throughout the decades leading to 1941, the US defense establishment was aware that 
Japan’s expansionist policies posed a challenge that could not be ignored. The presence 
of American imperial and commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific regions, coupled with 
the uncertain state US-Japanese relations, meant that an armed confrontation was a 
distinct possibility. The development of a strategy to protect the Far East from Japanese 
incursions was therefore treated as a priority. Equally important was to create an 
intelligence apparatus that could gauge the threat posed by Japan’s armed forces.  
 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the US had established a chain of island bases in the 
Pacific stretching from Hawaii to the Philippines, the purpose of which was to protect the 
sea communications with its growing trade and economic concerns in Asia. The rise of 
Japan’s influence posed the greatest potential danger, especially after 1905, when its 
forces defeated Russia, and gained an ascendant position. In 1907, navy strategists took 
the first step towards developing a war plan against Japan, codenamed Orange.15 In the 
event of hostilities, the fleet was to sail to the Philippines, and the US army to protect 
major installations in the islands.16
                                                 
15 ‘Orange’ was the color code designated for Japan. For example, Great Britain was designated 
‘Red’; Germany, ‘Black’; Mexico, ‘Green’. 
 Further apprehensions surfaced after the First World 
War, when the IJN emerged as the third largest fleet in the world. Japan also acquired the 
island colonies that had previously been held by Germany, including Micronesia and the 
Carolines, thereby securing a network of bases which lay astride the trans-Pacific sea 
lanes. Last but not least, in an effort to reap rewards for siding with the Allied powers, 
Tokyo demanded special economic concessions in China. This action threatened to 
undermine the US principle of maintaining an ‘Open Door’, which discouraged the 
pursuit of imperial gains that could jeopardize free trade in Asia. The main aim of the 
Washington Conference of 1921-22, convened by President Warren Harding, was to set 
up a treaty that restricted the possibility of Japanese expansion. The participants of the 
conference, namely the US, Japan, Great Britain and a host of other European powers, 
16 Morton, Strategy, pp.22-5 
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signed a number of agreements which set limits on naval construction, while at the same 
time discouraging further territorial conquests in the Far East.  
 
Although the Washington treaties alleviated the possibility of Japan encroaching upon 
Western interests, US defense officials were wary that peaceful relations could not last 
indefinitely. Indeed, Japan’s pursuit of a pacifist policy ended in 1931, when the 
economic effects of the Great Depression led the military to demand that their nation’s 
problems be solved through aggressive territorial expansion on the Asiatic mainland. In 
September, the Kwangtung army invaded Manchuria. In 1937, after the IJA launched a 
full scale invasion of mainland China, Japan made further moves to damage the status 
quo. Tokyo also took an increasingly hostile stand towards the West, as evidenced by the 
signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940. Between 
autumn 1940 and July 1941, Japanese forces started to menace Southeast Asia by 
occupying French Indochina. In response, the Roosevelt administration imposed 
sanctions on a number of vital war materials, including aviation fuel, scrap iron and oil. 
The steady deterioration in US-Japan relations provided convincing reasons to anticipate 
an armed confrontation, as well as motivation to establish an intelligence machinery that 
could monitor the situation in the Pacific regions. 
 
The main bodies responsible for handling information on Japanese strategy were the 
Navy Department’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the War Department’s 
Military Intelligence Division (MID), also designated as G-2. Both organizations had 
existed since the latter part of the 1800s, and underwent significant growth during the 
First World War.  
 
A noteworthy feature of US interwar intelligence was the absence of a centralized 
authority for coordinating the activities of the Navy and Army. The MID and ONI 
conducted separate operations, with few formal mechanisms for ensuring regular liaison. 
The lack of cooperation had some unfortunate effects. At the level of collection, the 
armed services did not always share the material they gathered. At the highest levels of 
the defense hierarchy, the Joint Board provided a forum where planning staffs from the 
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army and navy could exchange their views. However, the service chiefs did not have 
access to the intelligence reports produced by their counterparts, and lacked the means to 
present an informed critique of their rival service’s conclusions. The process of net 
assessment was further hindered by lack of communication between the defense 
community and civilian agencies.17 Political leaders formulated their own policies, and 
did not always provide the armed services with clear guidelines on the strategies they 
needed to develop. 18
 
 Defense chiefs found themselves developing war plans without 
understanding the policies advocated by the State Department and Executive Branch. 
Equally uncertain was the level of funding that would be allocated for defense 
expenditure in the event of war, which in turn, made it difficult to predict the forces that 
would be made available. 
Financial shortages also constrained intelligence activities. Congressional cuts in defense 
spending during the 1920s resulted in a dramatic reduction in resources. By 1922, G-2 
slashed its staff from 282 officers at the end of the First World War, to forty-four.19 Its 




Yet, in spite of the problems, US intelligence organizations undertook a sizeable effort to 
collect data on Japanese policy. Intelligence emanated from two main sources. The first 
was the signals intelligence organizations of the Navy and War Departments. The service 
attachés based in Japan and the Far East were the second key source. The incoming 
information was processed by the ONI and MID, both of whom operated dedicated 
sections for East Asian affairs. At the policymaking level, G-2 and naval intelligence 
regularly contributed extensive assessments on the situation in the Far East, and the 
                                                 
17 Christman, ‘Strategic Assessment’, pp.224-5 
18 L. Brune, The Origins of American National Security Policy: sea power, air power and foreign 
policy, 1900-1941 (Manhattan, KA: MA/AH Publishing, 1981), p.62-3 
19 Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, pp.252, 256-7 
20 W. Packard, A Century of US Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence 
/ Naval Historical Center, 1996), p.17 
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documents were included as annexes to the memoranda produced by the plans divisions 
of the service departments. 
 
In the area of signals intelligence, the navy and army achieved a significant expansion of 
their capabilities. Henry Hough and W. Galbraith, who served as Director of Naval 
Intelligence (DNI) between 1923-27, took the first steps in improving the ONI’s sigint 
section, by establishing a research desk for studying wireless and cable interceptions.21 
Despite the progress, as late as 1928, the ONI conceded that its code-breaking work was 
limited by the lack of personnel and funds. 22  Nor did naval intelligence have the 
resources to establish an adequate number of cryptographic units in the Pacific.23
 
  
Within army intelligence, for much of the 1920s, the joint War-State department cipher 
bureau, more commonly known as the Black Chamber, was responsible for intercepting 
and decrypting foreign signals traffic. 24  Established under the leadership of Herbert 
Yardley, a sigint specialist, the chamber achieved a number of breakthroughs, including 
the deciphering of highly-classified Japanese diplomatic codes. Unfortunately, cutbacks 
in funding curtailed the chamber’s activities until finally, in 1929, Secretary of State 
Henry Stimson ordered it shut down, on the grounds that the interception of foreign 
governmental communications constituted a ‘highly unethical’ procedure.25
 
 
The dismantling of the Black Chamber did not discourage the intelligence community’s 
effort to develop a codebreaking apparatus. Within the MID’s signals service, the 
government which received the greatest attention was the Japanese.26
                                                 
21 J. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: the US Navy’s intelligence dilemma, 1919-1945 (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1983), pp.41-2 
 In fact, the Foreign 
Ministry’s Red machine was the first cipher instrument to be studied while in actual use. 
22 NARA 2 RG 38, DNI Official Correspondence, Box 1, Comment on ‘Relation between Naval 
Intelligence and Naval Communications’: prepared by ONI, 18 April 1928 
23 NARA 2 RG 38, DNI Official Correspondence, Box 1, Cryptographic Section, Memorandum 
for Director of Naval Intelligence, by Lieutenant-Commander P.P. Powell, 10 January 1928 
24 Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, p.327 
25 Ibid., pp.329-30 
26 NARA 2 RG 457, Records of the NSA, Box 2, Studies on Cryptology, 1917-77: History of the 
Signals Intelligence Service, Volume 3, The Peace, 1919-1939 
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Naval sigint was equally active. Although the Asiatic Fleet’s interception unit was phased 
out in 1929, the fleet still had an officer attached from the Navy’s central radio 
intelligence organization in Washington, OP-20-G. 27  During 1931-32, when Japan 
commenced its incursions into Manchuria, Asiatic Fleet officers prepared to expand their 
sigint network. An intercept station had been established at Guam in 1925, and in the 
following year, another two were set up in the Philippines.28 An intercept unit was also 
located at the US legation in Peking, and in summer 1935, a listening post was 
established at Shanghai. OP-20-G also stepped up the training of cryptanalysts. By 1936, 
there were half a dozen radio operators based in the Far East. The total number of ONI 
operators working with Japanese codes rose to 103 by 1941, including forty on the 
Asiatic station and twenty-nine in Hawaii. By 1938-39, Japanese naval codes and ciphers 
consumed all of the US Navy’s cryptanalysis efforts, and ninety percent of its translation 
activities.29  Yet, the Navy was unable to decipher anything more than ten percent of the 
IJN’s coded traffic, owing to the complicated manner in which the communications were 
encrypted. Nonetheless, the Americans did obtain some valuable information, particularly 
when intercepting signals related to the IJN’s fleet exercises. Intelligence obtained from 
the June-August 1933 grand fleet maneuvers, for example, confirmed that in the event of 
war, the Japanese navy was contemplating an attack on the Philippines, as well as 




The service attachés based in Tokyo provided the second key source of intelligence. The 
information from this channel is also better documented than sigint. Between 1918-41, 
the ONI and G-2 stationed a succession of attachés in Japan who provided reports based 
on a range of sources, including the press, as well as statements by government and 
military officials. Naval attachés in diplomatic posts across Asia also monitored the 
                                                 
27 Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, pp.45-6, 81-3 
28 Lewin, Other ULTRA, p.28 
29 Mahnken, Ways of War, p.58 
30 Naval War College, Newport, RI, (NWC), Manuscript Collection, Papers of Captain Edwin T 
Layton, Box 21, C-in-C Asiatic Fleet, SRH-223, Various reports on Japanese Grand Fleet 




 Following 1937, with the outbreak of hostilities in China, 
military attachés became an important source on the IJA’s activities. On the whole, the 
attachés were familiar with the developments taking place within Japan and the attitudes 
which the government and armed services held in regard to the Western powers. Thus, 
US intelligence activities during the interwar period demonstrated an awareness of the 
need to collect information on the threat posed by Japan’s pursuit of an imperialist policy. 
The lack of reliable intelligence cannot be attributed to poor tasking. 
Nature of the intelligence collected 
Despite the progress achieved in establishing an intelligence apparatus, neither the ONI 
nor MID managed to secure comprehensive information on Japanese strategy. The 
secrecy with which Japan’s leaders formulated their policies acted as a constant obstacle. 
Intelligence was mainly derived from open sources, and the material tended to provide a 
broad outline of the desires which the Japanese held for undermining Western influence 
in the Far East. However, US personnel were less able to secure information on more 
detailed aspects such as the extent to which the IJN and IJA were willing to initiate 
hostilities to achieve their aims, and the war plans they were considering.  
 
The most significant problem facing US intelligence was that Japan did not have a 
definite plan for waging war against America and its allies for a large part of the interwar 
period. During the 1920s, following the Washington treaties, the service attachés could 
confidently report that US-Japan relations were likely to remain cordial. Pro-war 
sentiments were confined to military and naval circles, whose influence on government 
policy was marginal. For much of the decade, Tokyo maintained that following a policy 
of peaceful coexistence with the US was in the best interest for Japan’s national security. 
Therefore, measures towards rearmament, such as the raising of the defense budget, were 
not necessarily taken as indications that the armed forces were preparing for war.32
                                                 
31 NARA 2 RG 38, DNI Official Correspondence, Box 1, Naval Attaché (Tokyo) to Director of 
Naval Intelligence, 5 January 1928 
 The 
32 NARA 2 RG 165, M-1216, Roll 2, MID 2063-324, Military Events in Japan during month of 
May 1929, prepared by Military Attaché (Tokyo), and Current Events in Japan during month of 
September 1925, prepared by Military Attaché (Tokyo) 
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Commander-in-Chief of the US Asiatic fleet claimed that he did not think ‘there [was] 
even a remote possibility of trouble with [Japan] for some years to come’.33
 
 
Yet, the possibility of Japan pursuing a more forward policy remained a possibility. The 
only developments that that could be calculated with certainty were the broad areas 
where it would seek to expand. Geographical factors provided a number of portents. As 
early as 1921, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Burnett concluded that one of Japan’s key 
requirements was to obtain a secure supply of raw materials.34
 
 The Asiatic mainland was 
therefore a likely objective, since it provided the most accessible source.  
The aftermath of the Manchurian incident in 1931 saw mounting evidence of Japan 
holding ambitious schemes. In 1933, the government announced a plan to establish a 
reserve of financial resources and armaments, in an effort to prepare for extended 
operations in Manchuria and China.35
 
 However, there was little evidence to suggest that 
Japan had drawn any concrete plans to initiate a war against the US. 
The fact of the matter was that for much of the 1930s, Japan’s main objective was to 
consolidate its gains, and avoid further breaches with foreign powers. The situation 
changed after the commencement of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, and US 
intelligence began to pick up indications of a desire to secure complete control over 
mainland China. Military leaders also showed little concern for respecting American 
commercial and economic concerns.36
                                                 
33 United States National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (NARA 1), RG 
38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Intelligence Division, Box 459, File C-9-e, Naval 
Policy in the Far East: prepared by Captain A. St. Clair Smith, 31 August 1926 
 In gauging the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, 
US intelligence tended to monitor the security of American territories, including the 
Philippines, Guam and Hawaii. At the same time, a close eye was kept on the colonial 
possessions of America’s allies, most notably Great Britain, France and Holland. In 
34 NARA 2 RG 165, M-1216, Roll 17, MID 2023-376, Study of Japanese Troop 
Communications, prepared by Military Attaché (Tokyo), 5 October 1921 
35 NARA 2 RG 165, M-1216, Roll 2, MID 2063-324, Comments on Military Events in Japan, 8 
March 1933, prepared by Military Attaché (Tokyo) 
36 NARA 2 RG 165, M-1216, Roll 3, MID 2063-357, Report on Current Events in Japan, by 
Military Attaché (Tokyo), 22 December 1939 
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conducting any operation against Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, Japanese forces were 
likely to seek measures aimed at removing the US navy’s ability to interfere. In addition, 
any moves into Southeast Asia were bound to bring the IJN and IJA within striking 
distance of American positions in the western Pacific.  
 
Yet, while Japan was undertaking moves which threatened the western powers, its 
strategy remained undecided. Officials in Tokyo understood that the annexation of British 
and Dutch territories in Asia could elicit US intervention, but were circumspect about 
facing such scenarios. The main objective was to bring the war effort in China to a 
successful finish, with southward expansion being a secondary goal. The development of 
a coherent strategy was further hindered by army-navy disagreements. The IJA viewed 
the USSR as the ultimate enemy, and insisted on preparing for an invasion of Siberia. 
Army leaders thus argued that southward expansion be limited to Indochina, and were 
particularly anxious to avoid a confrontation against US and British forces.37 The IJN, on 
the other hand, envisaged a complete conquest of the southern regions, and maintained 
that in carrying out the move, Japan needed to engage in an oceanic war against the 
western powers. Yet, as late as June 1941, army opposition prevented the navy from 
implementing its strategy.38 When Japan occupied southern Indochina in July, its leaders 
had not agreed on any definite policies for expanding into Southeast Asia. The aim was to 
place Japan’s forces in a favorable position to seize the oil resources of the East Indies if 
the need arose, and in the meantime, continue with the China operations while remaining 
on guard against the USSR.39
                                                 
37 M. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: the search for economic security, 1919-1941 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1987), pp.174-5 
 Only in August, after the US and its allies froze Japan’s 
overseas assets and imposed an oil embargo, did policymakers decide that an occupation 
38 Ibid., pp.208-9; N. Ike (ed), Japan’s Decision for War: records of the 1941 Policy Conferences 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1967), p.50 
39 A. Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 
1987), pp.144-6; N. Shinjiro, ‘The Drive into Southern Indochina and Thailand’, in J.W. Morley, 
(ed.) The Fateful Choice: Japan’s advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-41, from translated series, 
taiheiyo senso e no michi: kaisen gaiko shi - Japan's Road to the Pacific War (NY: Columbia UP, 
1980), pp.235-7 
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of the southern regions was imperative.40 Even in September, when the decision was 
made to commence preparations for war against the US, Admiral Nagano, the navy chief 
of staff, along with the civilian leaders, insisted on a last-ditch effort to negotiate a 
rapprochement and secure a lifting of the sanctions. 41
 
 It was not until November, 
following the accession of Prime Minister Tojo’s hard-line government, that the final 
decision for war was ratified. Nor was it until the same month that the high command 
approved Admiral Yamamoto’s plan for a preemptive strike against the US Fleet at Pearl 
Harbor.  
Under the circumstances, the bulk of the material collected by US intelligence was likely 
to suggest that Japan was preoccupied with its operations in China. In March 1938, 
Colonel Joseph Stilwell reported from Peking, ‘since Japan cannot pull out and China 
refuses to quit, the prospect of a long-drawn-out struggle increases’. 42 The available 
evidence also indicated that Japan wished to avoid taking on any additional adversaries. 
Lieutenant-Commander Henri Smith-Hutton reported that the Cabinet had rejected 
German proposals for strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance 
aimed at Britain and France, out of fears that such measures might provoke the western 
powers into cutting off Japan’s vital supplies of imported raw materials.43 Although naval 
circles advocated an occupation of the East Indies, Japan was unlikely to undertake such 
moves so long as she had the option of securing oil supplies through diplomatic 
negotiations with the Batavia government.44
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Japan’s moves also depended largely on developments transpiring in Europe. Before 
making a commitment to support Germany in its quest to destroy the British empire, the 
high command needed to monitor the strategic balance, and thereafter judge whether the 
situation favored the Axis powers.45 The signing of the Tripartite pact in September 1940 
emboldened Tokyo to take a bolder stand against the West.46 Nevertheless, Japan was 
more likely to hesitate to expand the scope of its operations, at least until the European 
conflict turned decisively against Britain.47
 
  
An equally important consideration was the need to prepare for hostilities against the 
USSR. This became especially true after Germany launched operation Barbarossa in 
June 1941. While the IJA was reluctant to initiate a confrontation with the Red Army, 
especially after the defeats it suffered during the border clashes at Changkufeng and 
Nomonhan between 1938-39, the Japanese were unlikely to forego the opportunity to 
occupy Siberia and share the spoils of a German victory. In July 1941, a signals decrypt 
revealed that Foreign Minister Matsuoka had informed the embassy in Berlin that the IJA 
was ‘preparing for all possible eventualities’ and ‘keenly watching developments’ in 
eastern Siberia so that she could decide on when to join Germany in ‘combating the 
Communist menace’.48
 
 American consuls in China also reported a steady buildup of army 
divisions along the Manchuria-Siberia frontier. The direction in which the main thrust of 
Japanese expansion could head therefore remained uncertain. 
During the final months leading up to Pearl Harbor, the available intelligence did little to 
clarify the exact moves Japan intended to undertake. The problems of collecting 
information had become acute during the late 1930s. The Foreign Ministry introduced the 
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Purple cipher machine in 1939, which used a more complicated code than its Red 
predecessor. In 1939, the IJN also overhauled its communications system and set up the 
JN-25a code. Although by late 1941, progress had been made in decoding JN-25a, the 
Navy undertook yet another switch in December by introducing a new variant, JN-25b, 
which remained largely unbroken until a few months following the outbreak of the 
Pacific War.  
 
The service attachés also faced a difficult task, mainly because they did not have the 
means to collect intelligence via clandestine means. In 1939, the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) commented on how the ONI did not possess an undercover service 
equipped to carry out espionage, and lamented that the shortcoming gave US intelligence 
a ‘distinct weakness’ in comparison its foreign counterparts.49 The MID did not propose 
the establishment of a secret intelligence network in the Far East until November 1941, 
and its creation was disrupted by the outbreak of hostilities the following month.50
 
 As a 
result, by the eve of Pearl Harbor, US intelligence was significantly handicapped. 
The reasons for the failure to foresee the moves which Japan undertook during the 
opening stages of the war, namely the difficulties in decoding the IJN’s communications, 
the ineffective cooperation between the ONI and MID, and lack of appreciation for 
Japanese military capabilities, have been explained in previous works.51
                                                 
49 Packard, Naval Intelligence, p.44 
 However, two 
key features, both related to the nature of the material that was available to US 
intelligence personnel, deserve highlighting. First, information from human sources was 
not entirely convincing. While the naval attaché in Tokyo received several indications of 
an impending Japanese attack, the material did not provide concrete indications of the 
events which were to unfold. In March, an attaché report quoted a statement by a former 
IJN admiral, to the effect that war against the US would commence with the navy 
conducting attacks against the Philippines and Hawaii. However, the statement appeared 
50 Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, pp.438-9 
51 See Note 6, above. 
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more as a bellicose announcement.52 Reliable sources also indicated that the main thrust 
of Japan’s expansion would be directed against Thailand and the Burma Road, in an 
effort to tighten the blockade of China’s supply routes to the West. In October, the US 
consul in Hanoi reported that the Japanese had demanded access to four air bases in 
Cambodia.53
 
 US intelligence therefore become fixated on Southeast Asia, and was not 
compelled to pay close attention to the possibility of attacks against the Philippines or 
Hawaii. 
Second, intercepts of Japanese communications, which intelligence staffs tended to rely 
on more extensively, provided reliable indications that war was imminent, but did not 
specify where the Japanese might strike. While American cryptographers had decoded 
Purple by 1941, the information provided by diplomatic sigint was limited to that 
pertaining to policy objectives, since they were written and sent by foreign ministry 
officials who did not have a full knowledge of the strategies which military leaders in 
Tokyo were planning.54 On 15 November, Tokyo instructed its consulate in Honolulu to 
report regularly on the position of US ships based at Pearl Harbor.55 Naval intelligence 
translated the message in early December, and the information suggested that the 
Japanese were contemplating an attack on Hawaii. Yet, the evidence simply indicated 
that efforts were being made to ascertain the status of the US fleet, without providing 
concrete details of an impending operation. US intelligence also picked up the foreign 
ministry’s ‘Winds message’ of 19 November, ordering all diplomatic missions to destroy 
their cipher machines upon receipt of a coded weather report indicating the imminence of 
war.56
                                                 
52 Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, p.163 
 On 2 December, both army and navy intelligence received word that Japanese 
missions in Washington, London, Singapore and  Manila had been ordered to dispose 
their telegraphic codes and related documents. Nevertheless, the location of naval units 
could be determined only by breaking JN-25a and JN-25b, which by all reliable accounts, 
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had not been fully decoded in December 1941.57
 
 The situation therefore does suggest that 
a significant portion of the difficulties facing US intelligence lay in the area of collection. 
Intelligence assessments of Japanese strategy 
The assessments produced by the ONI and MID reflected the vague nature of the 
information they received from the Far East. Although deductions could be made that 
Japan’s leaders were striving to secure an Asiatic empire, the likelihood of their resorting 
to war remained open to speculation. To complicate matters, intelligence staffs in 
Washington had convincing reasons to conclude that Japan’s strategy would be 
constrained by its fear of provoking a conflict in which it would have to confront the US 
and the Associated Powers. By autumn 1941, while the intelligence community was 
aware that the Japanese were preparing for further conquests, the accepted conclusion 
was that an advance into Southeast Asia entailed a number of risks which the leadership 
in Tokyo was unwilling to face. In the final analysis, the Japanese were considered 
unlikely to provoke a war which they could not win in the long run.  
 
During the interwar years, army intelligence acknowledged the possibility that US 
interests in the western Pacific were subject to attack, and the Japanese could gain 
predominance with relative ease. As early as 1927, Situation Monograph Orange 
predicted, ‘Japan will send a force which will assure the capture of [Luzon] before relief 
can come from the United States’.58
                                                 
57 For an alternative explanation, to the effect that the ONI was in fact reading JN-25, and thus 
able to decipher signals communications which suggested that the Japanese were launching an 
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subject of dissemination must assess a number of variables, including interdepartmental rivalry, 
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Proponents of the conspiracy theory have thus far relied upon circumstantial evidence, namely, the 
fact that the Roosevelt administration was desperately seeking a valid pretext by which the US 
could enter the war without provoking hostilities. To date, there is no archival evidence to suggest 
that the US leadership’s handling of the situation was part of a careful design.  
 The MID was also aware that the distances which 
58 NARA 2 RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Box 63, File 167, Situation 
Monograph Orange (Draft), prepared by G-2, 1 January 1927 
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separated Japan’s empire from America’s main bases in the Pacific gave the enemy 
certain advantages in terms of defensive capabilities. A combat estimate prepared in 1939 
concluded, ‘so long as the sea routes between Japan and eastern Asia are under the 
control of the Japanese Navy it would be extremely difficult’ for any power to oust the 
IJA from its conquests. 59 Similarly, the ONI deduced the probable scope of Japan’s 
ambitions with considerable foresight. In 1923, an intelligence bulletin noted that the 
‘Japanese are thoroughly imbued with the idea that [their nation] must expand beyond her 
home borders to secure room for her surplus population and provide an independence in 
resources’.60
 
 A strongly-imbued sense of cultural superiority also gave rise to the belief 
that Japan had the preordained right to achieve domination over Asia.  
Yet, while Japan had strong motives to wage a war of conquest, and was likely to possess 
certain advantages in such a conflict, the likelihood of encroachments on western 
interests in Asia remained difficult to predict. For starters, Japanese leaders had a number 
of compelling reasons to refrain from hostile action against the US. The most important 
consideration was to maintain an adequate war economy, given Japan’s lack of 
indigenous supplies of raw materials. The ONI noted how the armed forces depended on 
American imports for the majority of their war materials, and if the home islands were 
blockaded, ‘the deficiency of annual consumption over annual production would exceed 
eighty percent in the case of such vital essentials’ such as oil, iron ore, rubber and tin.61
                                                 
59  United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA (MHI), Army War College, 
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Because the US, the British Empire and China were Japan’s greatest markets and 
principal sources of raw materials, a declaration of war against these countries appeared 
60 NARA 1 RG 38, Security Classified Publications, Box 13, ‘Japan: Estimate of Political-
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illogical. 62  G-2 also concluded that Japan’s shortage of raw materials would be 
‘disastrous’ in any war where access to overseas markets was denied.63
 
  
During the run-up to the Pacific War, US intelligence organizations could only 
hypothesize on where Japanese expansion was heading. Army intelligence acknowledged 
the possibility that the imperial forces could threaten Southeast Asia and the western 
Pacific. In February 1941, G-2 warned that, while the bulk of the IJA was tied down in 
China, the IJN was ‘unhampered in the South China Sea’.64 The Philippines, Singapore 
and the Dutch East Indies thus lay exposed to attack. However, the MID was unable to 
identify concrete signs of an imminent advance against US positions. On the contrary, its 
predictions were affected by credible signs that military shortcomings would continue to 
urge caution on Japan’s leaders. Among the most important problems was that a large 
portion of the IJA’s troops were committed on the Asiatic mainland, with the remainder 
defending the home islands. In January 1941, the assistant chief of staff opined, ‘Japan 
will not risk an attack on the Netherlands Indies, Singapore or the Philippines without 
first establishing at home an army in the order of half a million men to guard against 
possible counter-invasion’. 65
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 The available intelligence provided ‘no evidence of the 
mobilization of such a protective force’. The Japanese were considered unlikely to be 
able to muster the forces necessary for an extensive campaign. On the northern flank, the 
IJA was making a sizeable effort to prepare for war against the USSR in the event the 
Red Army collapsed, and the move hampered Japan’s capacity to expand. Commenting 
on a report by the military attaché at Tokyo in July, which indicated a strengthening of 
the Kwangtung Army’s divisions along the Manchukuo frontier, G-2 deduced that the 
IJA’s operations in the south would be confined to Indochina, with the main drive 
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directed towards the maritime provinces of Siberia.66 Given their shortage of surplus 
forces, the Japanese were unlikely to conduct a southward advance. Although the IJA 
continued to assemble a field force that could be deployed against either Southeast Asia 
or Russia, its policy was largely influenced by the desire to ‘resort to every means 
available to keep the United States out of the war’.67 As late as nine days prior to the 
outbreak of war, G-2 concluded that although Japan had the initiative, its forces were 
overextended, and unable to ‘concentrate the required forces to attack any of [its 
objectives] on a large scale and with assurance of success’.68
 
 
Economic factors also appeared to limit Japan’s options. The oil embargoes and freezing 
of Japan’s assets drastically curtailed its supplies of raw materials, and made it imperative 
for Tokyo to reach an understanding with the US, or face further economic ruin. 69
 
 
Because Japan could not afford further breaches in its relations with America, any 
conquests in the southern regions were likely to be confined to areas such as Thailand, 
where the Japanese did not have to encounter the armed might which the Associated 
Powers could bring to bear. The most important factor which the Japanese were 
considering was their inability win a war against the US and its allies in the long run, so 
the MID believed. Although the assessment suggests a miscalculation of the events that 
were to transpire, the fact remained that the Japanese needed to contend with a number of 
obstacles before moving into Southeast Asia. In light of the available information, army 
intelligence was most likely to predict prudence on Japan’s part. 
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Naval intelligence was equally ambivalent, for similar reasons. The existing evidence 
appeared to indicate that the IJN would be discouraged from launching an attack on US 
and British interests, owing to the difficulties involved in carrying out such a complicated 
operation. In 1941, W.D. Puleston, the former DNI, contended, ‘with all her strength, 
Japan labors under the inescapable disadvantage’ of being an insular nation, dependent 
upon sea communications.70
 
 In the event of war, the US fleet based at Honolulu and the 
Philippines could cut off all Japanese trade routes with America and Europe.  
Between late 1940 and December 1941, the ONI attempted to predict Japan’s strategy, 
without complete success. The raw data did not suggest that Japanese forces would 
invade key targets such as the East Indies and Malaya, let alone US bases in the Pacific. 
In a series of fortnightly reports, naval intelligence concluded that Japan would seek to 
defeat China, and expand its influence in the southern regions through a combination of 
political maneuvering and economic penetration. In March 1941, when the Vichy 
government in Indochina rejected the IJA’s demands that parts of Cambodia and Laos be 
ceded to Thailand, the Japanese brokered an agreement calling for the transfer of a 
smaller amount of territory.71 The move signified efforts to form closer relations with the 
Thai government and thereby expand Japan’s empire by peaceful means.72 Likewise, 
Tokyo’s application of pressure on Batavia for economic concessions did not enable 
forecasts that an invasion of the East Indies was forthcoming. While the Japanese press 
had adopted a bellicose tone, the general impression gained from government statements 
was that no drastic measures would be taken in the foreseeable future.73
 
 
Statements by government and military officials were also taken to indicate a further 
deterioration in relations with the US. However, the ONI was reluctant to conclude that 
American interests in the Far East faced an imminent danger, owing to the lack of firm 
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intelligence. When the Roosevelt-Nomura-Hull meetings began in September, military 
leaders made a number of statements which suggested that ‘Japan would use force, if 
necessary to break the American-British-Dutch-Russian encirclement’ that threatened its 
empire.74 However, the ONI went no further than to suggest that the move was probably 
aimed to strengthen public support for an impending war, and no forecasts were drawn as 
to which areas the Japanese were targeting. As late as November, when Japanese leaders 
were finalizing their war plans, the ONI could only state that the available evidence 
pointed to the possibility of further moves. Tojo stated that his government ‘would 
continue [its] policy of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere’, but opinions 
among Japan’s leaders appeared divided over whether to attack Siberia, or conduct a 
drive against the Burma Road in an effort to complete the strangulation of China’s 
lifelines to the West.75
 
 
Naval intelligence was also unclear on the significance of the information pointing to 
Japanese troop dispositions and location of task forces. By late November, the IJA moved 
close to 100,000 troops into southern Indochina.76 Even then, the ONI only deduced that 
‘strong indications point to an early advance against Thailand’. 77  The conclusion fit 
squarely with the notion that Japan intended to avoid confronting the main Allied forces 
in the Far East. As far as naval activity was concerned, the deployment of forces in 
Indochina and the Mandates indicated ‘clearly that extensive preparations are underway 
for hostilities’. However, the target could not be determined. On 26 November, the 
Fourteenth Naval District at Honolulu informed the ONI that the Japanese had been 
organizing a task force composed of two main fleets and the combined air force.78
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naval forces were en route to the South China Sea, while air units had been assembled at 
Hainan and Formosa. Yet, the most that could be deduced was that ‘a strong force may be 
preparing to operate in Southeast Asia, while component parts may be expected to 
operate’ from the Mandated islands. Without a definite indication of how the Japanese 
intended to use their army and navy dispositions, intelligence analysts could only 
speculate on the operations that might be undertaken. 
 
At the decision-making level, the attempts made by US defense planners to gauge the 
possible scenarios that could arise, in the event Japan declared war, also reflected the 
difficulties arising from the lack of accurate intelligence. On one hand, observations of 
the Japanese leadership’s actions provided convincing reasons to conclude that it 
harbored ambitious plans for territorial expansion. In 1938, the Joint Planning Committee 
produced the Study of Joint Action in Event of Violation of Monroe Doctrine by Fascist 
Powers, which put forward a prophetic forecast of Orange objectives.79
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 The assumption 
was that ‘Germany, Italy and Japan may be joined in an alliance’, and ‘the action of any 
one or two of these Fascist nations will receive the sympathetic support of the others’. 
Events had indicated that Japan sought control of China, along with objectives further 
afield, including the Dutch East Indies. To achieve these aims, it was in Japan’s interest 
‘to avoid or reduce possible interference’ by neutralizing British and US naval power. 
Japanese strategy therefore had two additional objectives, the first of which was to 
occupy US positions in the western Pacific. The second aim was to establish an outer 
defense perimeter in the Marshall and Caroline islands in order to interdict naval forces 
that attempted to harass Japanese forces. The above-mentioned moves were exactly in 
line with those which Japan undertook during onset of the Pacific War. By 1940, defense 
chiefs became acutely aware of the strategic complications that could result from a 
further deterioration in relations between Japan and the western powers. General George 
Strong, the assistant chief of staff at the War Department’s plans division (WPD), warned, 
‘the ejection of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands from the Far East would render 
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the United States hold on the Philippines and Guam wholly insecure’.80 The possibility 
that Tokyo might resort to aggressive action was also acknowledged. In July, when the 
Roosevelt administration was considering the imposition of oil sanctions, the WPD 
argued that ‘any further action denying the supply of petroleum derivatives… in a last 
analysis, would require measures which are tantamount to war’.81 Admiral Stark, CNO, 
and General George Marshall, the army chief of staff, also did not favor economic 
reprisals, on the grounds that such measures might provoke Japan.82
 
  
At the same time, US officials concluded that, even if Japan declared war, the prospects 
of the IJN and IJA coping effectively with the forces ranged against them were open to 
doubt. Again, the contention was based on reliable indications which suggested that 
Japan did not have the strength to carry out bold moves. In January 1941, the WPD stated, 
‘the capture and occupation of [the oilfields in Java and Sumatra] in the face of British 
and Dutch opposition would require a major operation’ that would take considerable 
time.83 The IJA could spare no more than 100,000 troops for the southern regions, and 
‘only a portion of the air force’ could provide sustained support for landing operations.84
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setbacks in the European theater created the ‘favorable conditions’ for actions against 
Southeast Asia and Siberia.85
 
  
Logistical factors were also cited as a key obstacle. The War Plans Section at the Marine 
Barracks in Quantico, investigated the possible routes of advance which the Japanese 
could take from its bases in Indochina. An overland attack on the Burma Road or Malaya 
was not feasible, owing to the ‘time and distances involved’, and the ‘difficulty of 
supply’.86 A landing on the east coast of Malaya, within close proximity of Singapore, 
was possible, but required an overseas operation involving a large number transports and 
combatant vessels, and the difficulties of carrying out such a move were ‘manifest’. In an 
assessment of enemy strategy prepared as part of an estimate of overall production 
requirements in the event of war, the Joint Board concluded that Japanese operations in 
Southeast Asia would have to be made at a great distance from home base.87
 
 If the IJN 
and IJA encountered protracted resistance, their ability to continue with their offensives 
was ‘problematical’, owing to a lack of adequate resources and industrial facilities. 
US planning staffs also considered an attack on American territories to be unlikely. Again, 
the available intelligence provided good reasons to downplay the possibility of such 
scenarios. The majority of the IJA’s troops were concentrated in Indochina, from which 
Thailand was the closest target.88
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patrol of over 300 long-range seaplanes, many more than were available. 89  If the 
Japanese wished to commence the war by launching a surprise attack, the fleet at Pearl 
Harbor was most likely to suffer heavy damage. However, by 1941, the accepted 
conclusion was that Japan could not provide adequate forces for a large scale expedition 
in the central Pacific areas. An aide-memoir prepared by the Hawaiian Department, for 
the WPD, opined, ‘an attack in force against Oahu necessitates an air superiority that can 
only be had by the establishment of land-based air within striking distance’.90
 
 The only 
suitable bases were the outlying islands, and Japanese forces needed to overcome strong 
US defenses in order to secure them. Again, in light of the apparent difficulties which the 
IJN was likely to face in executing an operation across large expanses of ocean, coupled 
with the absence of reliable indications that the Japanese were seriously contemplating 
such operations, US defense planners were unlikely to become overly concerned about 
the security of their Pacific bases. The speed and scale of Japan’s advance was indeed 
necessary to convince the Americans that their adversary possessed substantial 
capabilities. 
Influence on war preparations 
War plans against Japan were based on an understanding of the key challenges which the 
US navy and army were likely to face, namely the potential scope of the operations that 
Japan intended carry out, as well as the measures needed to defeat enemy forces. The 
defense establishment’s estimate of the situation in the Pacific was one of a myriad of 
influences on the policymaking process. A number of economic and political 
considerations played a pivotal role. Among the most important were the limits which 
Congress had placed on defense expenditure, which meant the armed services could not 
count on having substantial resources at hand. Isolationist opinion within the US public 
also restricted the extent to which defense planners could devise strategies which called 
for the deployment of large forces overseas. Nevertheless, perceptual factors were 
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significant. The ever-present possibility of Japanese encroachments on US interests in the 
Far East meant that planning had to be conducted with a sufficient level of readiness. At 
the same time, observations of Japan’s behavior suggested that it was reluctant to 
provoke a war against the western powers. Consequently, the Americans developed a 
strategy based on the idea of maintaining a visible, albeit moderate, military presence in 
the Pacific regions. Such actions were aimed to dissuade Tokyo from embarking on any 
aggressive ventures, at least until US forces could be sufficiently bolstered to hold out 
against an onslaught.  
 
During the early part of the 1920s, defense planners tended to draw up strategies that 
were beyond the capacity of US forces to implement. One official historian described the 
first post-World War One Orange plans as ‘more a statement of hopes than a realistic 
appraisal of what could be done’.91 For example, in 1923, Admiral Robert Coontz, the 
CNO, proposed a plan whereby the Asiatic fleet, with its meager assortment of surface 
vessels and submarines, would attack Japanese convoys and merchant vessels.92 The plan 
reflected an optimistic appraisal regarding the relative capabilities of Orange and Blue 93 
forces. A number of factors hindered the prospects of formulating a realistic strategy. 
During the postwar period, US politicians preferred to cut back on defense spending, in 
the hope that large scale wars were a thing of the past. Subsequently, the armed forces 
were not able to develop the forces necessary to carry out their ambitious plans. Military 
policy was also frequently based on principles, rather than a careful analysis of Japanese 
strengths. The first principle stipulated that a war in the Pacific needed to be won by 
going on the offensive.94
 
 The second principle was derived from the political belief that 
the loss of the Philippines would undermine national prestige.  
Yet, strategic planning demonstrated an awareness that the defeat of Japan’s forces 
required an arduous effort. In addition, as the interwar years progressed, the Joint Board 
paid heed to the possibility that in the event of hostilities, American forces might not 
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have the strength to hold out. By the mid-1930s, war plans were scaled down, and US 
strategy was confined to the defense of the western hemisphere. Public opinion also 
continued to adamantly oppose the commitment of large forces to defend areas removed 
from the American mainland. The limits on defense spending further complicated efforts 
to develop a military machine that was capable of waging a large scale conflict. As the 
Pacific War approached, strategists were faced with a complicated problem. On one hand, 
US forces needed to deploy adequate resources to guard against Axis incursions in both 
the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Because the German threat in the Atlantic was judged to 
be more serious, only a minimal force could be deployed against Japan. At the same time, 
Japan’s intentions were uncertain, and the possibility remained that its leaders would 
hesitate to declare war on the US and its allies. Strategy was based on the assumption that, 
in spite of the weak state of American forces in the Pacific, a show of strength was 
sufficient to prevent Japanese encroachments. 
 
Because a campaign in the Pacific was largely a maritime venture, the Navy had the 
predominant voice in the planning process. The Joint Board had a reasonably clear idea 
of the objectives which US forces needed to achieve. The 1928 draft of plan Orange, 
prepared in conjunction by the army and navy, articulated the measures to be taken in the 
event of hostilities, namely to gain control over the waters surrounding Japan’s home 
islands, and destroying its war-making capabilities by strangulating the economy through 
an extended blockading campaign.95 The establishment of naval power in the Pacific also 
required the development of a secure line of sea communications between Hawaii and the 
Philippines, and the occupation of intervening harbors and islands, including Guam. 
Much to the detriment of the US Navy, the ‘non-fortification’ clauses of the Washington 
treaty prohibited the strengthening of bases west of Hawaii, and for this reason, work on 
the Guam base made minimal progress.96
 
 However, the underlying principle of using the 
Philippines as an advanced base remained unchanged during the 1920s.  
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As the interwar years progressed, defense planners began to comprehend the difficulties 
of conducting a campaign across the extended distances of the Pacific. Due attention was 
paid to the possibility that Japan could attack the Philippines with overwhelming strength. 
In the 1928 joint basic war plan, the Army estimated that Japan could raise and transport 
an army of 30,000 troops within thirty days.97 Against this, the Americans could put up a 
mere 11,000 troops. The most pessimistic assessments emanated from Philippine 
Department. A successful surprise attack, conducted by a sufficiently large expeditionary 
force, could enable the enemy to ‘establish [itself] firmly on the shores of Manila Bay 
and the surrounding country’, and thereafter prepare to destroy the arriving US Fleet with 
air attacks delivered from bases on Luzon.98 While air and submarine operations against 
Japanese convoys could slow down the invasion, without sufficient land forces based in 
the Philippines, there were few realistic means of holding Manila.99
 
 
The deteriorating situation in the Far East, following Japan’s aggression against 
Manchuria in 1931, led US officials to further reflect on the problem. The passing of the 
Tydings-McDuffie bill in 1934, which promised independence to the Philippines by 1944, 
also raised questions whether a military presence in the islands should be maintained. 
American forces were likely to face significant trouble in resisting a determined attack, 
but at the same time, the retention of the Philippines was important from a strategic point 
of view. In 1936, the Joint Planning Committee took note of the conclusions reached by 
the Secretaries of War and Navy, namely that the ‘cumulative effects of successive 
developments during the past two decades have so weakened [America’s] position vis-à-
vis Japan’, that any war in the Far East could be fought successfully only with the 
greatest difficulty.100
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efforts to strengthen them were futile, the Navy was reluctant to commit to any reduction, 
since the prospects of executing Plan Orange could be jeopardized unless the fleet had 
access to an adequate base in the western Pacific.101  In regard to grand strategy, the navy 
maintained that the defeat of Japan required a large scale campaign. The army, however, 
argued that such actions could detract from the main focus, namely the defense of the 
western hemisphere.102
 
 The Americans were therefore attempting to formulate a viable 
plan without any guarantees that the necessary resources would be available. Nor was 
there any certainty whether the Army and Navy would be able to carry out a course of 
action.  
At the same time, defense officials could not forecast Japan’s actions with certainty, and 
the ever-present possibility that the removal of American forces may encourage 
aggression led the Joint Board to adhere to its policy of maintaining a forward base in the 
Philippines. On the other hand, Japan could hesitate to move, if its forces faced the 
prospect of military and naval opposition. In light of the uncertainties surrounding the 
conditions under which a war against Japan would be conducted, it was natural for any 
strategy to be speculative. War plans were improvised to fit in with the harsh reality that 
US forces may not be able to reinforce the Philippines immediately following the 
outbreak of hostilities. In December 1937, in an attempt to reconcile the navy and army 
views, the Joint Board demarcated the Alaska-Oahu-Panama triangle as the front line of 
defense.103
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As the possibility of war grew during the late 1930s, US strategy was developed with a 
view to dealing with a variety of contingencies. By 1939, the rising threat of German 
aggression in Europe necessitated a plan that enabled the simultaneous deployment of 
forces in the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. The Rainbow plans, drawn up between 1939-
41 were designed to cope with this dilemma. The 1939 version assumed that the Axis 
powers would undertake concurrent attacks on US interests if the opportunity arose, and 
stipulated that the defense of the western hemisphere take first priority.105 At the same 
time, a number of eventualities could arise, and defense chiefs had to be ‘ready to adapt 
and use existing plans by modifying them as necessary’. The Rainbow plans thus 
included five variations, each dealing with a particular scenario. The first version focused 
on the western hemisphere, with the second and third focusing on the Pacific. The fourth 
and fifth variations called for a projection of US forces to the Atlantic theater. The 
decision to send forces to the Pacific was dependent on the magnitude of Japan’s 
conquests during the onset of hostilities. Rainbow 2 stated that if the enemy confined 
itself to Indochina, reinforcements would be sent to the Netherlands East Indies and 
Malaya. Rainbow 3 envisaged a situation whereby the Japanese had conquered the 
southern regions, in which case the US was unlikely to have the means to maintain 
sufficient naval forces in the area.106
 
  
The widening scope of Axis expansion during 1940 necessitated a more forward strategy. 
Perceptions concerning the feasibility of containing the Japanese underwent significant 
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changes. In 1939, planners were confident that even if Orange forces invaded the 
southern areas, the IJN would maintain the bulk of its forces north of Formosa, in order to 
protect the home waters from the US Fleet.107
 
 The Allies could thus use their advanced 
bases in the Philippines and East Indies to push back the enemy. However, by spring 
1940, the fall of Holland and France meant the European powers could no longer be 
counted upon to defend the Atlantic, nor could they provide sufficient forces for the Far 
East. Under the circumstances, any strategy which assumed a substantial Allied presence 
in the Pacific was unrealistic.  
At the same time, the Japanese threat had to be weighed up against the more pressing 
concerns arising from Germany’s conquest of Western Europe, which jeopardized the 
security of the British isles. The maintenance of the latter was vital to protect the trans-
Atlantic sea lanes and western hemisphere. Whereas encroachments on the Pacific were a 
possibility that could develop in the future, Nazi Germany’s threat to the Atlantic was a 
real and present danger which required immediate action. The second and third variations 
of Rainbow, calling for concentrations the Pacific, were therefore not applicable.108 In 
June, Roosevelt requested the army and navy planners to reconsider the Rainbow plan, 
and draw a strategy based on the assumption that Germany continued to threaten Britain, 
while Japan remained neutral.109 General George Marshall and Admiral Stark both agreed 
that the protection of the British isles and the Atlantic sea lanes was a top priority, and for 
this reason, operations in the Pacific had to be confined to the defensive.110 Plan Dog, 
prepared by Stark in November, stipulated that American security depended to a large 
extent on Great Britain’s survival. A British collapse held such serious ramifications that 
the US needed to provide every possible form of assistance, including the eventual 
dispatch of naval, ground and air forces to the Atlantic Ocean and Western Europe to 
defeat Hitler.111
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confrontation could not be averted indefinitely. In the event that the US faced such a 
situation, its actions in the Pacific were to be limited to ‘permit the prompt movement to 
the Atlantic of forces fully adequate to conduct a major offensive’.112
 
  
US war plans were thus based on the premise that commitments in the Far East had to be 
relegated in order to provide sufficient defenses for the Atlantic. On 21 December, the 
Joint Board ordered its staff to prepare the details of Plan Dog, so as to have them ready 
for presentation to the British during the upcoming Anglo-American staff negotiations to 
be held at Washington. Between January and March 1941, US and British defense 
planners aimed to clarify the objectives which Allied forces were to achieve in the event 
that America entered into the war. The final plan which emerged from the talks, ABC-1, 
closely resembled Plan Dog. ABC-1 described the Atlantic and European area as the 
most decisive theater, and stipulated that the main Allied effort was to be concentrated 
there. The US was not to increase its military strength in the Far East, but in the event of 
war, the Pacific Fleet was to be employed ‘in the best manner calculated to weaken 
Japanese economic power’.  
 
While US defense chiefs had a clear view regarding the paramount importance of the 
Atlantic, they were less realistic in their plans for defending the Pacific. The main 
mission was to contain Japanese aggression, and yet, the practical means for 
implementing the plan remained vague. After ABC-1 received the approval of the CNO 
and chief of army staff, the Joint Board issued a directive for the preparation of Rainbow 
5.113 The general assumption was that initially, Allied forces would be fighting Germany 
and its European allies. 114
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Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis forces’ while supporting the defense of 
British and Dutch territories. The plan appeared to overlook the fact that US forces were 
not adequate to hold out against a concerted attack. Again, in June, the Navy General 
Board prepared a memorandum titled Are We Ready?, and conceded, ‘Rainbow No.3 is 
the only Navy basic war plan in suitable shape for effective execution’.115 The navy was 
also not ready for a two-ocean war, since it had only 40% of the necessary battleships.116
 
 
The assessment did not cause apparent concerns with Admiral Stark or any naval officials. 
The most probable explanation for the insufficient attention paid to the lack of military 
preparedness was a growing belief shared by defense planners, that the mere presence of 
US forces in the Asia-Pacific area could deter Japan, and any operation by the Imperial 
navy and army would therefore be directed against more weakly defended areas. Defense 
planners not only became convinced that efforts to discourage Tokyo from provoking 
hostilities were likely to succeed. More importantly, given the weak state of US forces, 
the Americans needed to avert war by all possible means, at least until their strengths in 
the Pacific regions could be sufficiently augmented to cope with the Japanese. 
Convictions regarding the value of deterrence can be largely attributed to the 
uncertainties which surrounded the course of future events in the Far East.117
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put forward by Admiral James Richardson, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet, that 
the US capital ships based at Pearl Harbor could not physically halt Japanese moves in 
the western Pacific, Roosevelt maintained that the retention of the fleet at Hawaii was 
essential to discourage further encroachments.118
 
 The statement reflected a widespread 
view that the shortage of strength could be compensated by undertaking moves aimed to 
convince the Japanese that any expeditions would meet difficult opposition. Yet, the 
perception was natural, in light of the available intelligence. 
The notion that deterrence could contain Japan became widespread by the autumn, after 
the Joint Board approved the plan to reinforce the Philippines with a substantial number 
of medium-range B-17 bombers. In June, defense chiefs already expressed serious doubts 
whether the Japanese could successfully attack the Philippines. Shortly after the 
American, British, and Dutch naval commanders finished their negotiations at Singapore 
(codename ABD), Stark and Marshall, with presidential approval, rejected the British and 
Dutch proposal that American reinforcements be sent to the Philippines. The justification 
was that the existing forces were sufficient, and any Japanese effort to defeat them would 
require ‘a considerable effort’.119
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that Japan’s alignment with the Axis powers necessitated protective measures.120 Army 
planners saw the occupation of Indochina in July as a further indication that an enhanced 
commitment was necessary. 121  Nevertheless, the move was intended as a deterrent, 
without much thought given to how the forces would operate if hostilities broke out.122 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson conceded to Roosevelt in October that the bomber threat 
might be doubtful, but claimed, ‘even this imperfect threat, if not promptly called by the 
Japanese, bids fair to stop Japan’s march to the south’.123
 
 By reinforcing the Philippines, 
the Americans could bide their time, and avert hostilities until their military position was 
strengthened. 
Large sections of the defense establishment, particularly within the War Department, also 
concluded that Allied forces could inflict crippling losses on a Japanese expedition.124 
The belief was based on an exaggerated confidence regarding the capabilities of high-
altitude bomber aircraft against naval task forces, as well as an underestimation of 
Japan’s military strengths and its determination to eliminate Allied positions in Southeast 
Asia. However, in the absence of any firm indications that the Japanese were seriously 
contemplating a large scale expedition, policymakers were unlikely to have a clear idea 
of the dangers they faced. The WPD contended that the Associated Powers should 
attempt to halt Japan along the ‘general line of Hong-Kong to the Philippines’, the latter 
of which held the key to maintaining the line.125
 
 South of this line were ‘successive 
positions from which the combined ground, air and naval forces of the Associated Powers 
could exact a tremendous toll’.  
The prospect of suffering excessive losses, in turn, was cited as the main factor that 
would dissuade a Japanese attack. In an analysis on Japanese forces and capabilities, the 
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WPD went as far as contend that ‘the presence of adequate heavy bombardment based in 
the Philippine islands will deter the Japanese from any movement to the southward’ until 
US defenses were neutralized.126 In addition, the army garrison that was planned to be 
established was expected to make the operation ‘so expensive that the Japanese will 
hesitate’. Any attempt to eliminate the air forces based in the Philippines required Japan 
to rely on carrier-based aviation, and intermittent long-range air support based in Taiwan. 
Again, the cost of the operation was deemed unacceptable to the Japanese.127
 
 Only the 
scale and speed of Japan’s advance into Southeast Asia and western Pacific in December 
1941 could convince the Americans that their strategy was inadequate. 
Conclusion 
During the interwar period, two key factors complicated US efforts to forecast the moves 
which the IJN and IJA were likely to undertake. First, the Japanese leadership in Tokyo 
did not hold any definite plans to initiate hostilities against America and its allies. Until 
autumn 1941, the main objective was to secure control over the Chinese mainland. In 
spite of exhortations by the militarists for the elimination of western influence in the Far 
East, the Japanese demonstrated a willingness to achieve their objectives without having 
to confront the western powers. Second, even when the Japanese high command decided 
to declare war on the US, its strategy was guarded with a secrecy that hindered an 
accurate prediction. Under the circumstances, the Americans were unlikely to collect a 
significant amount of concrete information on an imminent attack on their main bases at 
Pearl Harbor and the Philippines.  
 
At the level of analysis, intelligence staffs were aware that Japan held aspirations for 
achieving hegemony in the Far East. Furthermore, geographic factors gave the IJN and 
IJA certain advantages, in that they were able to deploy their forces against the western 
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Pacific regions before the US could provide any substantial reinforcements. However, the 
assessments produced by the ONI and G-2 tended to reflect the difficulties that arose 
from the lack of accurate information. As late as 1941, neither organization was able to 
determine the objectives which Japanese forces would seek. The situation was further 
complicated because Japan’s forces appeared to face a number of complications that 
could limit the scope of their operations. For starters, the navy and army were dependent 
on imported supplies of essential war materials, including oil, iron, rubber and tin. The 
economic sanctions imposed by the US and its allies during 1940-41, in response to the 
occupation of Indochina, cut off the bulk of Japan’s supplies, and made it necessary for 
Tokyo to either seek a rapprochement with the US or alternatively, find new sources by 
conquering Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. The latter option entailed the risk of 
encountering opposition from Allied forces. The IJN was considered unlikely to launch 
operations in which it would have to face the forces which the US could bring to bear, 
while the IJA appeared to be committed on the Asiatic mainland, to the point where it 
could not provide the forces needed for large scale operations in Southeast Asia. 
Operations against Allied strongholds at Singapore and the Philippines were therefore 
ruled out.  
 
The impact of intelligence on US war plans in the Pacific was more complicated. 
American defense policy during the interwar years was largely shaped by a number of 
political and economic factors, including a public apathy towards international affairs, 
coupled with limitations imposed by Congress on military expenditures. By the time the 
US began to depart from its policy of isolationism in 1940, its attention was focused on 
the European theater. Nazi Germany posed a more immediate danger, since its attacks on 
the British isles and the trans-Atlantic shipping routes directly threatened the US 
mainland and western hemisphere. The Pacific regions were relegated as a secondary 
concern, and in the event Japan declared war, US forces were to remain on the defensive. 
Because the North Atlantic was the area in which matters appeared to be coming to a 
head, policy towards Japan was geared to fit in with this pre-occupation.128
                                                 




Yet, while war plans in the Pacific were largely shaped by political factors and 
considerations related to the overall strategic situation facing the US, perceptions of the 
Japanese threat did play a distinct role. The Joint Board formulated its plans on the 
understanding that a campaign against Japanese forces required a substantial commitment 
of resources. At the same time, the unpredictable nature of Japan’s strategy meant the 
Americans had to act in accordance with the prevailing circumstances. By the eve of the 
Pacific War, the absence of reliable indications pointing to Japanese encroachments on 
American interests gave rise to a widespread notion within the defense establishment that 
the presence of US forces in the Far East provided a reliable deterrent.  
 
Poor intelligence was not the sole cause for the failure to protect the interests of the US 
and its allies in the Asia-Pacific regions during 1941. A more realistic argument is that 
the defense establishment was aware of the possibility that Japan could attack Southeast 
Asia and the western Pacific. At the same time, the available intelligence did not indicate 
that Japan had definite plans for undertaking a conquest of territories in the region that 
were occupied by the US and the Associated Powers. On the contrary, the information 
provided compelling reasons to conclude that Japan did not possess the potential to defeat 
an Anglo-American coalition, and was therefore unwilling to risk a war which it could 
not win in the long run. The result was an air of optimism within the defense 
establishment. US perceptions of the threat posed by Japan were realistic in light of the 
information provided by the available intelligence. On one hand, the Americans paid 
close attention to the indications pointing to Tokyo’s ambitious policies, and made a 
conscientious effort to gauge the scenarios which could arise in the event the Imperial 
forces initiated hostilities. Yet, in the final analysis, the evidence suggested that Japan 
was not able to prevail in a protracted conflict against a combination of western powers, 
and for this reason, it was more likely to move cautiously. Therefore, a more accurate 
conclusion is that the shortage of good intelligence played a key role in convincing the 
US defense establishment that its war preparations in the Pacific were adequate, and that 
efforts to significantly bolster America’s defenses were not necessary. 
 
